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Abstract 
This paper studies the effects of The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 
(MACRA) and its impact on hospital reimbursements. Using Medicare data at the hospital level 
for fiscal years 2011 and 2015, this paper adds to current literature on the origin of Medicare 
policy changes through the use of nationwide hospital data, while including all 1,000 inpatient 
Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) definitions. The results from this paper suggest the emphasis 
that has been placed on delivering value over volume has effected hospital reimbursements. In 
2011 a 1% increase in total discharges meant a 0.0213% increase in average total payments, 
while in 2015 the same 1% increase resulted in only a 0.00575% increase in average total 
payments. Also, I found that a 1% increase in average Medicare payments increased average 
total payments, by 0.911% and 0.939% for 2011 and 2015 respectively. So overall, treating less 
patients with greater emphasis placed on value became standard thanks to MACRA. 
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1. Introduction  
 In 2016, the United States government spent $3.3 trillion on healthcare, which was 18% 
of the United States Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and that number is only growing 
(Historical, 2018). Of that $3.3 trillion, Medicare, the federal health insurance program for those 
over the age of 65 and those individuals with a disability, accounts for $710.2 billion (Cubanski 
and Neuman, 2017). Healthcare is clearly a large investment for the United States, as it ranks the 
highest among developed countries, spending $10,348 per person on healthcare (Sawyer and 
Cox, 2018). 
This paper analyzes the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 
(MACRA), which potentially changed the way physicians and patients interact with one another. 
MACRA’s main goals were to reimburse physicians solely based off value, rather than volume. 
In order for this to take place, the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) was repealed, while the 
Quality Payment Program (QPP) was implemented, along with the Merit-Based Incentive 
Payments System (MIPS) and the Alternative Payment Methods (APMs) to reward physicians 
for quality service. Historically, when a Medicare policy change is implemented it effects 
hospitals financial well-being. I set out to study whether MACRA effected hospital 
reimbursements as Medicare prices were set to be cut 30% by 2085. (Medicare Access and 
CHIP, 2015). Specifically, I analyzed Part A of Medicare, which is known as The Federal 
Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (HI).  
My study contributes to the literature in a number of ways: I utilized nationwide hospital 
data, it pertains to all 1,000 inpatient Diagnoses Related Groups (DRG) definitions, it is not 
limited to a specific department or surgery type and lastly, I analyzed the most recent Medicare 
policy change, which had a direct effect on hospital reimbursements. This paper utilized three 
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datasets publicly available from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and 
Medicare.gov. The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File (Inpatient PUF) was used 
for 2011 and 2015. The last dataset was the Medicare Spending per Beneficiary (MSPB) 
Spending Breakdowns by Claim Type File. I utilized seven econometric models to develop a full 
understanding of the impact MACRA had on hospital reimbursements. These models were based 
on prior studies in health economics, which analyzed past policy changes in Medicare. 
Specifically, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) and the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (BBRA). The 
literature showed that the PPS implementation from TEFRA had a positive impact on hospital 
revenues as well as costs, regardless of whether or not hospital admissions decreased. However, 
unlike the PPS policy change, the BBA had a negative effect on hospitals, which should not be 
surprising due to the fact it was implemented to prolong the HI Fund. The main paper my model 
is based off of is He and Mellor (2012) who analyzed the effects of Medicare changes on 
outpatient surgery reimbursements.  
I hypothesized that the implications of MACRA would lower costs for physicians of 
hospitals, therefore reimbursements would increase over the four-year period studied. Also, with 
a greater emphasis placed on reimbursing properly for the higher value provided, I hypothesized 
that physicians of the hospitals would place even more emphasis on providing higher value care, 
because it would be incentivized accordingly. The principal agent problem states that physicians 
may not always be acting in their patient’s best interest due to the potential existence of 
information asymmetry (Rosenthal and Frank, 2006). 
However, despite the principal agent problem, my results were quite similar to a study 
conducted by White and Wu (2013), who found that a $1 reduction in Medicare inpatient 
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revenues is associated with a $1.55 reduction in overall net patient revenues, specifically 15 
cents of profit. I found that in 2011, a 1% increase in average Medicare payments resulted in a 
0.911% increase in average total payments. For 2015, a 1% increase resulted in a 0.939% 
increase in average total payments. In 2011, a 1% increase in total discharges resulted in an 
increase of 0.0213% in average total payments, however in 2015 a 1% increase in total 
discharges resulted in a 0.00575% increase in average total payments. This suggests that treating 
less patients with greater emphasis placed on value became standard thanks to MACRA. This 
means that the more patients admitted into the hospital and eventually discharged from the 
hospital does not necessarily result in more money for the hospital. This is shown due to the fact 
MACRA emphasizes value not volume.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 will describe hospital 
reimbursements, the past and present of Medicare and the role politics plays in healthcare. 
Section 3 surveys related literature. Sections 4 and 5 respectively describe the data and empirical 
methodology employed in the study. Section 6 presents the main findings. Section 7 opens up for 
discussion. Section 8 discusses policy implications, with section 9 ending the paper exploring 
future areas of research. 
2. Background on Hospital Reimbursement  
Receiving healthcare from a medical professional is inevitable, even for the healthiest 
citizens. According to Santerre and Neun (2013), a healthcare system is an overarching group of 
delegated persons, tasked with the organizational arrangement and processes to ensure society 
makes informed and educated choices regarding the production, consumption and distribution of 
healthcare services. A complex and ever changing system, the United States healthcare system 
consists of many players, including over 900,000 physicians and dentists, approximately 6,000 
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hospitals and 80,000 plus nursing homes and mental health facilities all serving the 330 million 
citizens each and every day. A typical system is constructed in a triangular formation, containing 
three major entities: patients, healthcare providers (hospitals, physicians, etc.) and insurers or 
third-party payers. In exchange for medical services, patients pay out-of-pocket fees to the health 
care provider. If an individual is fully insured then they pay nothing for their medical visit; the 
onus is completely on the insurer. In exchange for insurance coverage, patients pay monthly 
premiums to insurers to help pay for medical services. And lastly, in exchange for the actual cost 
of the medical service provided, health care providers are reimbursed by insurers through the 
submission of claims (Santerre and Neun, 2013).  
Hospitals are generally reimbursed through a fixed payment scheme, meaning that they 
are set independent to the amount or cost of medical services actually provided to patients for a 
given and defined treatment episode. For higher costs associated with additional services under 
the fixed payment scheme, hospitals bear the full financial risk. Ever since the implementation of 
the Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1983, hospitals have been reimbursed for services to 
Medicare patients using DRGs. Today, about 1,000 DRGs exist, taking into account many 
categories such as: diagnoses, procedures, age, gender, discharge status and if any complications 
arose. For each DRG, a prospective payment exists, which is claimed to Medicare and is the 
reason hospitals operate under a fixed payment scheme because it incentivizes hospitals to 
contain costs (Santerre and Neun, 2013). According to Guterman and Dobson (1986), this 
classification scheme allows for equitable payment and has four essential characteristics: the first 
being that they are determined in advance and fixed for that specific fiscal period, second, any 
individual hospital's payment rates are independent of their past or present costs or charges, 
third, every unit or service provided is accounted for its entire price, and lastly, every hospital 
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either keeps, or loses the potential difference that arises between the payment rate and the 
associated cost. The next section goes into detail on the history, development and current 
landscape of the Medicare program, specifically Part A. 
2A. Medicare 
Medicare, America’s federal health insurance program, was enacted in 1965 under Title 
XVIII of the Social Security Act. Primarily for individuals 65 or older, Medicare also covers 
individuals under the age of 65 who have a permanent disability, such as end stage renal disease 
(ESRD) or amyotrophic lateral disease (ALS). In 1966, Medicare cost about $7.7 billion and 
approximately 19 million individuals were enrolled. Today, due to the increase in both cost for 
healthcare as well as the aging population, Medicare reached $710.2 billion and 59 million 
enrollees in 2016 (Cubanski and Neuman, 2017).  
There are four components to the program, however my study focused primarily on Part 
A, which covers inpatient hospital stays, skilled nursing facility stays, home health visits, acute 
care hospitals, critical access hospitals, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, long-term care 
hospitals, psychiatric hospitals and hospice care (including but not limited to: semi-private 
rooms, meals, general nursing, drugs as part of inpatient treatment and other hospital services 
and supplies). Services and miscellaneous items that are not covered include but are not limited 
to: private-duty nursing, private rooms (unless deemed necessary for medical reasons), television 
and phone services in the room and personal care items such as razors or slipper socks. If all the 
following are true, then a patient will be eligible who has coverage under Part A: if a patient can 
only be treated correctly in a hospital, if a patient is formally admitted to the hospital once 
officially ordered by a doctor to stay two or more nights, the hospital accepts Medicare as a form 
of payment and lastly, The Utilization Review Committee of the hospital approves one’s stay 
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(Your Medicare Coverage, 2018). In 2016, Part A was the second largest component at $290.8 
billion (Cubanski and Neuman, 2017).  
Part A is funded through The Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (HI). Payments to 
hospitals decreased by one-third from 2006 to 2016 and is estimated to be empty by 2029, which 
is not a good sign for hospitals (Cubanski and Neuman, 2017). In 2016, the HI Fund was 
primarily financed through a 2.9% payroll tax (split equally by employees and employers), 
which made up 87% of the entire insurance program. The remaining 13% was divided among 
transfers from states (8%), interest (3%), and other (2%, referring to transfers from the railroad 
retirement account, reimbursements from revenues from those uninsured, military wage credits 
and premiums of voluntary enrollees) (Cubanski and Neuman, 2017).  
Part B the largest section at $313.2 billion, covers physician office visits, outpatient 
services, preventive services and home health visits. Part C, (commonly known as the Medicare 
Advantage program), is financed through monthly premiums along with premiums under Part B 
and allows individuals to enroll in a private health plan (such as a health maintenance 
organization (HMO) or a preferred provider organization (PPO)) (Santerre and Neun, 2013). 
Lastly, Part D, which covers outpatient prescription drugs was $106.2 billion in 2016 (Cubanski 
and Neuman, 2017).  
As shown in Appendix A, Table 1, the deductible was $40 in 1966. Once that price was 
met, Medicare covered the rest of the charges until day 60. From days 61-90, the patient either 
pays a daily coinsurance payment equal to 25% of the inpatient hospital deductible, or the price 
listed in the table. On the 91st day, Medicare no longer covers hospital inpatients charges. 
However, lifetime reserve days are available for up to another 60 days, in which the patient pays 
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a coinsurance rate (which equals $670 per day in 2018).1 Due to the fact that lifetime reserve 
days are a once in a lifetime component of Medicare, any day spent in the hospital after lifetime 
reserve days are completely paid for by the patient. As shown throughout the rest of the paper, 
Medicare does not operate alone, but rather as a piece to a complicated puzzle along with 
providers, patients and services (Guterman, 2000). The next section analyzes the relationship 
between politics and healthcare. 
2B. Politics and Healthcare 
 Since the United States Constitution was implemented in 1789, the government has been 
comprised of three branches: executive, legislative and judicial. The executive branch carries out 
laws and is made up of the President, Vice President and the cabinet. The legislative branch 
(Congress) makes the laws and is divided amongst the Senate and House of Representatives. The 
judicial branch, which interprets laws, is comprised of the Supreme Court and other Federal 
Courts (Branches of Government, 2018).  
 The legislative branch, which is comprised of 100 Senators and 435 representatives, is 
instrumental in proposing and passing laws directly related to healthcare and more specifically, 
Medicare.2 Along with the House of Representatives, Senators duties include: drafting proposed 
laws, confirming or rejecting Presidential nominations for heads of federal agencies, federal 
judges, the Supreme Court and can declare war (Branches of Government, 2018). The Senate is 
governed by the Vice President, who is President of the Senate. Each state elects two Senators 
who are each granted one vote. A Senator's term lasts for six years, however there is no limit to 
how many terms one can serve. Senators are equally divided into three classes for election 
                                               
1 The 1966 prices were taken from Santerre and Neun (2013), while the 2018 prices were taken from Medicare 2018 
Costs at a Glance. 
2 The executive branch passes laws which are to be reviewed by the President who has final say to either pass or 
veto a bill. 
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purposes: Class I, Class II and Class III. After two years, Class I Senators face reelection, after 
four years, Class II Senators face reelection and after six years, Class III Senators face reelection 
(Qualifications and Terms of Service, 2018). 
 Democrats and Republicans do not agree on many controversial issues, one of them being 
healthcare reform. For nearly a century Democrats have been pushing for affordable care for all. 
The Democratic Party passed Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 under President Johnson. In 1997, 
under President Clinton, Democrats passed the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). In 
2010, due to President Obama's Affordable Care Act, 20 million Americans gained access to 
healthcare (Health Care, 2018). When it pertains to Medicare, Democrats wanted to keep the 
program as is, a public good, and lower the age of eligibility to 55 (Kenen, 2016).  
 As for Republicans, they highly opposed Medicare back when it was first implemented, 
saying it was the first step towards socialism. However in more recent years, they have been the 
Party known for increasing Medicare spending (Leonhardt, 2010). Their approach to Medicare 
was much different from the Democrats during the 2016 election process. Republicans stated 
they wanted to put Medicare on a more secure track, proposing to: grant individuals the option to 
transition to a premium support model, guarantee every enrollee an income-adjusted 
contribution, and to set a more realistic eligibility age as life expectancy increases (Kenen, 
2016).3  
3. Literature Review 
 The following sections will go through past Medicare policy changes and examine their 
impact on hospital reimbursements. Each section highlights relevant literature starting with the 
pre-Medicare era, then moving on to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the 
                                               
3 The proposed premium support model is stated to strengthen patient choice, promote cost-saving among 
competitors and better guard against fraud and abuse. 
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Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999, the Medicare 
Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 and lastly, an overview of the principal agent 
problem and its impact on healthcare. 
3A. Pre Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA, 1982) 
Ever since 1953, the American Hospital Association mandated that healthcare providers 
be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of providing services. When Medicare was legislated in 
1965, it utilized the same reimbursement scheme. However, what was deemed “reasonable” was 
under much scrutiny up until 1982 as Medicare expenditures grew 20% annually, with no telling 
when it would end. (Lave, 1984). Hellinger (1975) set out to study Medicare reimbursement and 
specifically how hospitals set their charges for delivery, laboratory, radiology and operating 
room services in 1970. Back then, hospitals could decide to be reimbursed using either the 
departmental or combination methods. This study primarily focused on the combination method 
because with higher Medicare utilization they could increase the charges. The results showed 
that Medicare utilization did in fact have an effect on profitability of a given department which 
supported the hypothesis that hospitals set their rate structure in order to maximize Medicare 
reimbursement. While a good analysis of the initial landscape of hospital reimbursement, this 
study is limited as it only analyzed four specific departments in 17 short-term general hospitals 
in Ohio. Also, there was no use of any econometric models to interpret any potential 
relationships. The next section incorporates relevant studies conducted on Medicare policy 
changes from 1982-1997. 
3B. TEFRA (1982) 
TEFRA forever changed the way hospitals were reimbursed. Signed by Congress in 
1982, TEFRA's impact is still present, as the Act had completely changed the way Medicare 
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reimbursed hospitals. The three major changes included: a per case system (instead of a per diem 
system), case-mix, which was taken into consideration and a maximum limit was implemented. 
Costs per case that were over 120% of the average were no longer considered “reasonable.” 
TEFRA mandated that the PPS was implemented. Initially, only 468 DRGs were used to classify 
patients which were comprised of area wages, the location of the hospital (urban or rural) and the 
number of full time interns and residents on staff. These fixed payments would cover operating 
costs, which would allow one to hypothesize that hospitals were to be reimbursed more under 
this new policy. Due to the fact that hospitals were to implement the new system within a three 
year period, it allowed for health economists to analyze the policy changes comparing the 
hospitals that switched to PPS right away versus those who stuck with TEFRA (Lave, 1984).  
Guterman and Dobson (1986) analyzed the impact of the transition to the PPS on 
inpatient hospitals, outpatient hospitals, physicians, skilled nurses and home health services. 
Utilizing data from the Health Care Financing Administration for fiscal years 1967-1984, the 
authors were able to analyze data pertaining to total Medicare benefit payments, beneficiaries 
and payments per beneficiary by analyzing the percent changes over the years.                                                                            
The authors hypothesized that Medicare admissions would increase post PPS. However 
they discovered that admissions per 1,000 enrollees actually decreased 3.5% while experiencing 
a 44% increase in net-income. So, despite a better payment system being implemented, hospitals 
became less popular but their profits increased. The authors attributed this to the fact that there 
was a greater emphasis placed on other services such as ambulatory care, along with physician 
offices and non-hospital emergency and surgical centers. This was referenced by many papers as 
policy changes that could affect revenue seemed to change hospitals behavior when determining 
patient mix.  
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Feder et al. (1987) utilized two sets of surveys to analyze the direct policy changes of 
TEFRA before and after the policy implementation. The surveys were from 1982 and 1984 and 
were administered by the American Hospital Association. The Survey of Hospitals’ Financial 
Status and Care to the Poor received 827 responses from hospitals who also reported valid 
Medicare costs. The second survey was the Annual Survey of Hospitals and received 2,819 
responses. Along with these surveys, actual 1984 PPS payment rates provided by the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA, now known as The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, CMS) were used. On top of utilizing a rather comprehensive data set, the authors also 
utilized multivariate regressions controlling for other factors effecting behavior, HMO 
enrollments, and physician supply. Using the individual hospital as the unit of analysis, t-tests 
were used to measure the percent change for various measures of hospital care. The authors also 
created an index to account for the PPS potential financial impact because hospitals face 
different levels of financial pressure. The index measured the shift from the prior reimbursement 
system to the PPS and how the hospital would have been effected if a hospital did not respond to 
the incentives. The index was defined as: 
Projected Change in the Medicare Net Inpatient Revenue= (Shift from Cost 
Reimbursement to PPS/Projected Total Revenue per Hospital)  
 Similar to Guterman and Dobson (1986), the authors found that Medicare revenues per 
case changed by about the same percentage for hospitals under PPS (18.1%) and under TEFRA 
(17.7%) in 1984. However, costs rose much more slowly for PPS hospitals (7.6%) versus 
TEFRA (18.1%) paid hospitals. Both studies showed how PPS was not effecting hospital 
behavior by constraining the growth in revenues per case and thus, the opportunity to earn a 
profit was influential. Also, under PPS, hospital admissions decreased 0.4% while TEFRA 
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hospitals increased 3.4% from 1982-1984. This study is limited due to the fact that the Projected 
Change in the Medicare Net Inpatient Revenue Index did not account for any institutional or 
behavioral changes made by a hospital after implementation of the PPS. 
The last relevant empirical paper to study the effects of PPS policy change was 
Eldenburg and Kallapur (1995). They analyzed the responses hospitals had in 1983 to the 
changes in Medicare reimbursement. The authors used data from the Washington State hospitals 
in the Commission Hospital Abstract Reporting System (CHARS). This data consisted of 115 
hospitals, which was eventually lowered to 68 hospitals due to mergers among small rural 
hospitals. The study accounted for hospital costs, revenues (inpatient and outpatient), units of 
service and full-time equivalent employees. The authors found that the ratio of Medicare 
outpatient revenues as a percentage of total Medicare revenues increased after 1983. This 
showed that hospitals began to offer more outpatient services to Medicare patients, opposed to 
non-Medicare patients. As shown by the literature, PPS implementation had a positive impact on 
hospital revenues as well as costs, regardless of whether or not hospital admissions decreased. 
The following section evaluates the empirical papers analyzing the Medicare policy changes 
from 1997-1999. 
3C. Balanced Budget Act (BBA, 1997) 
 The next major Medicare policy change occurred in 1997. The BBA of 1997 established 
Part C of the Medicare program, which was initially known as the Medicare+Choice (M+C) 
program, but today is referred to as Medicare Advantage. The main component of the BBA was 
to ensure Part A’s HI Fund was available in another ten years (2007). Over this ten year period 
over $390 billion was planned to be saved. This was attainable through the introduction of more 
private health plan options being available for Medicare beneficiaries. These included HMOs, 
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provider sponsored associations (PSOs), PPOs, Medicare Medical Savings Account (MSA) 
plans, private-fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, and Religious Fraternal Benefit (RFB) plans 
(CMS.gov). These plans, which were hosting open enrollment periods, would then take on some 
of the burden, which would have otherwise been all Medicare payments. Other ways in which 
this goal would be achieved was through the introduction of five new PPS (for both inpatient and 
outpatient rehabilitation hospital services, skilled nursing facility services, home health services 
and hospital outpatient department services) (An Examination of Key Medicare, 1997). Due to 
these policy changes, specifically attempting to prolong the life of the HI Fund, it would be 
expected that hospitals would have hurt from the BBA. Although other options would be 
available for patients to help afford much needed care, in terms of reimbursements from 
Medicare, it is expected to have negatively affected hospitals. The literature supports that notion. 
Das (2013) added to the literature by analyzing how The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
and changes in revenue from Medicare effected the financial condition of nonprofit hospitals. 
Using Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS) data from the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services from 1996-2004, Das focused exclusively on HCRIS (2552-96) data for 
private, nonprofit, acute-care hospitals. Das utilized the following model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐴 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1997) + (𝑑1997 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1997)
+ 𝜃2(𝑑1997 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑙1996 + ⋯ + 𝜃9(𝑑2004 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑙1996) + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a performance measure, 𝛼𝑖 is a hospital fixed effect variable, 𝛾𝑡 is a fixed effect for 
years, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐴 is a dummy variable taking a value of one for all years post 1998, 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1997 is a proportion of Medicare inpatient beds to total beds, 𝑑1997 is a dummy 
variable for 1997, 𝑦𝑖𝑙1996 is the value of the dependent variable for hospital i in 1996 and 
𝑑1997−2004 are dummy variables for each individual year analyzed (1996-2004). The last two 
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variables are included because hospitals may be at different stages relative to their desired 
financial targets. Das (2013) only utilized one model to serve the purpose of explaining the 
changes over the studied period.  
Das (2013) discovered the BBA resulted in about a 7% decline in revenue for an average 
nonprofit hospital. The revenue reduction significantly affected the total margin of these 
hospitals, which went down by 12%. Although this study supported the general hypothesis, it 
was limited due to the fact it only analyzed private, non-profit and acute care hospitals reactions 
to the policy change. 
Bazzoli et al. (2004) added to the relevant literature by assessing the effects of the BBA 
on hospitals and comparing those to the changes experienced from the PPS, utilizing a much 
wider data set. Using a method similar to Feder et al. (1987), the authors utilized data from 1996-
1999 which was obtained from the AHA Annual Survey and contained 1,218 hospitals 
nationwide. The first model used, known as the financial pressure index, analyzed the potential 
loss a hospital could be exposed to through a policy change. The second model, which is more 
relevant to my study, is the Medicare revenue change index and focused solely on Medicare 
revenue change. The model is given by: 
𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = [(𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1) ∗ 𝑀𝐶𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖,𝑡−1]/𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 
where 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is a Medicare revenue change index for hospital i during time t, 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is 
Medicare revenues per adjusted admission for hospital i during time t-1, 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 is Medicare 
revenues per adjusted Medicare admission for hospital i during time t-1, 𝑀𝐶𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖,𝑡−1 is an 
estimate of Medicare adjusted admissions for hospital i during time t-1, and 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is total 
hospital expenditures for hospital i during time t-1. 
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The authors found that, unlike from PPS policy change, that both high RCI and FPI 
hospitals did not reduce their number of Medicare patients due to BBA policy change. 
Intuitively, hospitals who faced the largest financial pressure made the largest adjustment to their 
Medicare cost base. Similar to hospitals responding to PPS implementation, the authors found 
that hospitals tried to limit the increase in cost of each Medicare case and attempted to extend 
outpatient care. This supported the notion that hospitals were experiencing tough times and were 
doing anything to stay profitable despite policy changes. Although utilizing data for hospitals 
nationwide, this study is limited due to the use of no formal econometric models. 
 White and Wu (2013) set out to estimate the effects of changes in Medicare inpatient 
hospital prices on hospitals’ overall revenues, operating expenses, profits, assets and staffing 
from 1996-2009. The data was from the Medicare hospital cost reports (HCRs) and the final 
sample comprised of 2,043 hospitals. Utilizing two stage least square model regressions, the first 
estimation is most relevant to my study: 
𝑅ℎ,𝑡 = ∅ℎ + 𝜑𝑑𝑖𝑣,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑝
6
𝑝=1
∆𝑃𝑝,ℎ,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚,𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐷𝐶𝐸𝑄 + 𝑛𝑋ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑘𝑍𝑀𝑆𝐴,𝑡 + 𝑙ℎ,𝑡 
where h indexes hospitals, t indexes years, div indexes Census division, 𝑅ℎ,𝑡 is Medicare 
inpatient revenue per DCEQ inflated to 2009 prices (DCEQ stands for discharge equivalent, 
which was developed to measure a hospital's output), ∆𝑃𝑝,ℎ,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚,𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐷𝐶𝐸𝑄
 is the accumulated 
impact of payment policy p per DCEQ inflated to 2009 prices, 𝑋ℎ,𝑡 is a set of time-variant 
hospital characteristics (such as case mix and local wage index), 𝑍𝑀𝑆𝐴,𝑡 is a set of time-variant 
characteristics of the market in which the hospital is located (share of the population in poverty, 
unemployment rate and share of the population receiving food stamps) and ∅ℎ is a set of hospital 
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fixed effects. This model incorporated many outside factors that could potentially effect a 
hospital and served as good inspiration while developing my study.  
 Similar to Bazzoli et al. (2004), the authors found that the hospitals that experienced the 
most payment cuts in 1997 were also the ones that faced the largest negative impact. Showing 
1% significance, the results showed that a $1 reduction in Medicare inpatient revenues was 
associated with a $1.55 reduction in overall net patient revenues, specifically 15 cents of profit. 
This shows that a loss of Medicare revenue appeared to have a negative spillover effect on total 
revenues. So unlike the policy change for the PPS, the BBA had a negative effect on hospitals, 
which should not be surprising due to the reason it was implemented. The next segment 
interprets the published papers that studied the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999. 
3D. Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA, 1999) 
 The BBA reductions in Medicare payments were working too well. Aimed to lower 
payments from 8.8% to 5.6% in a five year period, the BBA actually decreased payments by an 
annual rate of 3.9%. This concern prompted the BBRA to institute increases in Medicare 
spending, which aimed to increase Medicare spending $11 billion from 2000-2002. Despite this 
policy change, Medicare payments were still approximately 18.2% below baseline projections 
made in 1997 (Guterman, 2000). Due to the initiative to increase Medicare payments, one would 
expect that hospital's financial well-being would increase during this time period. 
He and Mellor (2012) investigated volume effects of the implementation of the outpatient 
prospective payment system (OPPS) legislation (which was effective in 1999, from the BBRA) 
on Medicare and private fee for service (FFS) patients. The authors chose Florida because it was 
the fourth most populous state, had the second highest state Medicare spending and accounted 
for over 8% of all Medicare spending nationwide.  
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The data utilized was from the Florida Ambulatory Discharge Data, which was obtained 
from the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). The main unit of analysis was 
patient discharge. Each discharge consists of the following: the total charge for the discharge, the 
principal payers, limited patient information, facility type and unique identification number. For 
my study, I borrow this model as I have obtained the same data for hospitals for both 2011 and 
2015. 
He and Mellor (2012) focused primarily on outpatient surgical procedures as they 
consisted of 47% of all Medicare payments for hospital outpatient services in 2007. The authors 
chose to keep the study focused on the top ten most common surgical procedures in 1999 (upper 
gastrointestinal endoscopy, diagnostic colonoscopy, extracapsular cataract removal, colonoscopy 
and biopsy, debride skin/tissue, blood transfusion service, lesion removal colonoscopy, lesion 
removal, removal of breast lesion and repair inguinal hernia) of the sample of hospitals studied. 
In 1999, there were 182 hospitals in Florida, which resulted in an average of 7,000 outpatient 
discharges. Due to the fact the authors focused on specific procedures and each procedure was 
reimbursed differently from the other, data on the Medicare reimbursement rate for each 
hospital, procedure of interest and year was used. For pre-OPPS years (1997-1999), the authors 
developed an algorithm to convert each charge to a payment using an outpatient surgery 
payment-to-charge ratio from each hospital’s annual Medicare Cost Report. Post-OPPS 
implementation was much easier, as payment data was readily available. Utilizing quarterly 
CMS publications reporting payments, the authors then created annual measures. 
The authors used the following empirical model:  
log(𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 log(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡) + 𝛼2 log(𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑡) + 
𝑍𝑐𝑡Π + 𝑋ℎ𝑡Γ + 𝑉𝑧𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛼ℎ + 𝜀ℎ𝑡 
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where 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡  is the Medicare reimbursement rate for a given procedure in hospital h in year 
t and can be interpreted as a price elasticity of volume given the log-log specification, 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑡 is 
the coinsurance amount associated with each procedure in each hospital h and year t, 𝑍𝑐𝑡 is a set 
of county-year-level controls (accounting for estimates of the total population size, the amount of 
individuals over the age 65, the percent of females in the population, the percent of Hispanics 
and blacks, median household income and estimates of county unemployment rates) and 𝑋ℎ𝑡 is a 
set of hospital-year-level controls (accounting for ownership status, teaching status, bed size, 
rural hospital status and critical access hospital status). 𝜆𝑡 and 𝛼ℎ are year and hospital fixed 
effects, while V is a dummy variable for zip codes.  
The second model is given by: 
log(𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡) ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ + 𝛽2 log(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡) 
+ 𝛽3log (𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑠)ℎ𝑡 +  𝑍𝑐𝑡Π +  𝑋ℎ𝑡Γ +  𝑉𝑧𝑡 +  𝜆𝑡 +  𝛼ℎ +  𝜀ℎ𝑡 
where 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ represents the share of the total number of outpatient surgeries in which Medicare 
FFS was the primary payer by approximating a hospital's exposure to Medicare program 
changes. The results showed that most elasticity estimates for 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 were positive, 
suggesting that OPPS induced rate cuts effect Medicare volume negatively. However, only three 
out of the ten surgical procedures (debride/skin tissue, removal of breast lesion and repair 
inguinal hernia) provided results that were significant, which offers weak evidence. On average, 
private FFS volume increased. The authors explained that this suggests that payment reforms that 
retain a fee-for-service are not effective because it increases demand for Medicare patients, 
therefore not actually decreasing Medicare costs. The next section describes a Medicare policy 
change that was not specific to hospitals, but I concluded was integral to understand when 
approaching my study.  
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3E. Other Policy Changes 
 While not specific to hospital reimbursement, the policy changes from 1998, which 
allowed females to receive biennial mammograms, is a relevant topic to study to gain a better 
understanding of the direct Medicare policy changes and how they affect the broader healthcare 
world. 
 Haberman et al. (2007) set out to evaluate the effects of the Medicare changes in 1998 on 
mammography reimbursement policy on the breast cancer stage at diagnosis disparity between 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO’s) and Fee-For-Service (FFS) beneficiaries. This 
particular study relates to my topic because of its specific analysis of a Medicare policy change. 
Since 1991, Medicare covered the cost of biennial screening mammograms for women over the 
age of 65. However, on January 1, 1998 Medicare expanded to allow for annual screenings. 
Particularly important to this study was the coverage that the beneficiary uses, whether that was 
an HMO or a FFS. This was important because historically HMO’s have been required to 
provide at the minimum, what FFS Medicare provides, however HMO's were also allowed to 
provide additional benefits.  
The authors utilized 30,857 female Medicare beneficiaries ages 65-74 (diagnosed with 
breast cancer from 1994-2002) from the population-based linked tumor registry/Medicare claims 
(Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results (SEER)-Medicare). Of this data set, 34.8% were 
enrolled in a Medicare HMO and 65.2% were enrolled in FFS Medicare. Hypothesizing that the 
gap between HMO and FFS mammograms would decrease as more FFS beneficiaries would 
now receive a mammogram, the results supported their hypothesis. Conducted through an 
ordered logistic regression model with predicting earlier stage diagnosis as the dependent 
variable, the authors adjusted for health plan type, time period, age at diagnosis, race (black, 
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nonblack or unknown), marital status (married, unmarried or unknown), and geographic location. 
The most relevant variable to my study was the interaction term between health plan type and 
time period (whether being before or after a change in FFS reimbursement policy). Shown 
through the interaction term, HMO beneficiaries were still more likely to be diagnosed at an 
earlier stage, both before and after the policy change but at a decreasing rate, a relative change of 
51.1%. The next section describes the specific Medicare policy change my study analyzed. 
3F. Medicare Access & CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA, 2015) 
The relevant literature all examined a policy change and how that effected hospital 
reimbursement. One of my contributions to the literature will analyze the changes instituted from 
the Medicare Access & CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015. Supporters pushed for this bill 
because of its positive long-term outlook. Expert's projected that by 2048 costs will be lower 
compared to the prior system and by 2085 the savings will be very noticeable as Medicare prices 
will be 30% less in 2085 (Pear, 2015). It is unclear how large the savings may be, anywhere from 
$35 billion to $106 billion over a 15 year span. However, one of MACRA's main drawbacks is 
that it will add $141 billion to the federal budget from 2015-2025. Also, doctors may be 
encouraged to stay away from the sickest patients, since patient outcomes will now be factored in 
(Medicare Access and CHIP, 2015). Despite these arguments, MACRA passed easily, with a 92-
8 vote in the Senate and a 392-37 vote in the House of Representatives (Pear, 2015).  
MACRA’s main goals were to reimburse physicians solely based off of value, rather than 
volume. In order for this to take place, the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) was repealed, while 
the Quality Payment Program (QPP) was implemented, with two different routes available. 
These routes, known as the Merit-Based Incentive Payments System (MIPS) and the Alternative 
Payment Methods (APMs) were implemented to reward physicians for quality service. Also, by 
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April of 2019 all Social Security numbers will be removed from Medicare cards. Through this, 
less reporting burdens will allow physicians to work more efficiently and there will be greater 
support for multi-payer initiatives (The Medicare Access and Chip, 2015). 
 SGR’s were enacted by Congress under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. They aimed to 
regulate the costs of physician services to Medicare patients. However, payments were linked to 
GDP, and it became a problem because SGR’s did not take into account the quality of care 
provided, so many physicians stopped treating Medicare patients (Shaw, 2015). So instead, 
MIPS was introduced, which reimburses physicians based on a score, which takes into account 
the quality and value of service provided. A MIPS composite score takes into account four 
performance categories: quality, resource use, clinical practice improvement activities and 
meaningful use of certified Electronic Health Record (EHR) technology. This is said to have the 
potential to adjust payments (either positively or negatively) by 4% by 2019, 5% by 2020, 7% by 
2021 and 9% by 2022 (The Medicare Access and Chip, 2015). 
The other track within QPP is rewarding physicians for utilizing APMs, which attempts 
to move Medicare away from FFS and more towards a payment system that is based off of 
outcome and overall population health (MACRA & Other Physician, 2015). Eligible APMs, 
which are the most advanced APMs and meet the following criteria: base payment on quality, 
require use of EHR technology, either bear more than nominal financial risk for monetary losses 
or be a medical home model expanded under Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
(CMMI) authority are subject to 5% lump sum bonuses (The Medicare Access and Chip, 2015). 
So how will this effect hospitals? It seems that for the more quality care provided, more 
money will be coming into a hospital. First off, a study from Health Affairs discovered that 
Medicare hospital cuts could reach $250 billion by 2030. Taylor (2015) stated that if successful, 
 25 
 
APMs are designed to keep patients out of the hospital, yet participation in APMs is the only 
way to increase reimbursement. Hospitals employ 70% of physicians that will be effected by 
MACRA, which means hospitals may be the ones paying for the administrative expenses 
(AHA.org). Also, it is important to point out that one quality measures report costs roughly 
$10,000.  
3G. Principal Agent Problem 
 The principal agent problem is an economic framework commonly referred to as a theory 
or relationship throughout health economics literature. Used to analyze circumstances in which 
an agent, who receives a reward for services, is not driven by market forces to provide the 
highest level of quality service to the principal (Rosenthal and Frank, 2006). Therefore, the agent 
is only interested in maximizing their own utility function, which may differ from the principal's 
utility function. Specifically within hospitals, there are three circumstances in which this problem 
arises due to information asymmetry: between the patient (the principal) and the physician (the 
agent), between the hospital board (the principal) and physician (the agent) and lastly, between 
the hospital board (the principal) and each hospital department (the agent) (Ludwig et al., 2010).   
 In the first situation, the physician (the agent), provides medical expertise to the patient 
(the principal), with the patient being unaware of how well he or she is treated. This may cause 
the physician to act upon their own utility function by acting the most efficiently and therefore, 
minimizing costs. This is the situation most relevant to my study as it directly coincides with the 
level of quality care provided by a physician. Although just introduced into hospitals, value-
based pay has been implemented in other industries. When financial incentives are introduced, 
one would expect the agents to react accordingly, however Rosenthal and Frank (2006) 
discovered that there are mixed results when analyzing pay-for-performance schemes. 
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 In the second situation, the hospital board (the principal) hires the physicians (the agent) 
to provide the medical expertise to patients, without being fully informed of exactly how 
efficient and effective the quality of treatment being delivered is. In the last situation, the 
hospital board (the principal) is concerned with the treatment of all patients, while each hospital 
department (the agent) is only concerned with the treatment of their specific patients. The 
hospital board is in charge of dividing up the annual budget amongst each department, however 
they are not the experts regarding how many inputs go into running a department the most 
efficiently, therefore making it a tough decision to justify why one department may need new 
equipment over another (Ludwig et al., 2010). 
My study contributes to the literature on many levels: first, I offer the empirical analysis 
of yet another Medicare policy change that will affect hospital reimbursements. Not only does 
my paper analyze the most recent policy changes in affect, but also analyzes the effect on 
hospitals nationwide for incorporating all 1,000 inpatient DRG definitions, along with a political 
party affiliation variable, which are not shown in previous literature regarding prior policy 
changes. This is not relatable to any prior policy changes because MACRA influenced the way 
physicians of hospitals interacted with their patients, while other policy changes aimed to simply 
increase or decrease Medicare spending. The impact of the implementation of MACRA will be 
assessed through the following data and empirical model sections below. 
 4. Data 
 The data utilized for this study was obtained from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services websites, CMS.gov and Data.Medicare.gov. The two main datasets, known as, the 
Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use Files (Inpatient PUF) were used for the fiscal years 
2011 and 2015, which were the first and last year’s available. The Inpatient PUF only went from 
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2011 to 2015, so that was the only data available for my study. The following variables were 
provided in both data sets: DRG definition, provider ID, provider name, provider street address, 
provider city, provider state, provider zip code, hospital referral region (HRR) description, total 
discharges, average covered charges, average total payments and average Medicare payments. 
Due to the fact that the data set was organized by DRG definition, many provider IDs appear 
multiple times because of the number of DRG’s treated. Since my study analyzes hospital 
reimbursement, I had to reconstruct the dataset to be at the hospital level, opposed to the 
individual level. To do this I filtered down each DRG definition per provider ID to just one 
observation per provider ID. This, along with filtering out unmatched provider ID with the 2015 
data set, minimized the number of observations I could analyze. The filtered down files used for 
my study contained information on inpatient discharges for Medicare beneficiaries for 3,125 
hospitals in the United States.  
 The following is an overview of the variables utilized in my study. Average total 
payment, my dependent variable, is defined as the total amount the provider receives for an item 
or service provided. This amount includes the Medicare Severity-Diagnosis Related Group (MS-
DRG) amount, bill total per diem, beneficiary primary payer claim payment amount, beneficiary 
Part A coinsurance amount, beneficiary deductible amount, beneficiary blood deductible amount 
and DRG outlier amount. Average covered charges is defined as the amount the provider bills 
Medicare, while average Medicare payments is the amount of payments the provider receives 
from Medicare. Total discharges indicates the number of beneficiaries who were released from 
the inpatient hospital after receiving care. Also, as shown in the next section, all the above 
variables were also accounted for in their natural log forms as previous literature did the same in 
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their studies. Of all the variables available from the Inpatient PUF, I concluded that these 
variables had the largest potential to influence a hospital's financial wellbeing.  
 I also added a political party affiliation aspect to the Inpatient PUF to account for 
potential correlation between changes in state officials who have an impact on Medicare policy 
changes. I used the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-present, which 
is publicly available on the United States Senate website, Senate.gov, to collect the political 
party for each Senator for both 2011 and 2015. In 2011, there were a total of 101 Senators 
because Nevada had three Senators that year (Biographical Directory, 1774).4 The following 15 
states experienced a change in political party affiliation between at least one of their Senators 
from 2011 to 2015: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota and West 
Virginia. I chose to utilize Senators for my political variable because they have a direct impact 
on legislation passed in the United States. Governors do not have the right to vote for legislation 
and Representatives are not equally divided amongst all states, rather proportionally 
represented.5 This is an important variable to incorporate due to a potential sway in voting due to 
a change in party affiliation of Senators over the years. 
 Appendix B, Tables 1 and 2, present the summary statistics for the Inpatient PUF. For 
both fiscal years, the mean of total discharges is rather close, with approximately 166 more in 
2015. Unlike the mean of total discharges, the mean of average covered charges tells a much 
different story between 2011 and 2015. Over the four-year period there was a large increase in 
the mean amount Medicare was being billed by providers and due to this large increase, the 
                                               
4 In 2011, Nevada had three Senators because John Ensign resigned when his term came to an end. Dean Heller was 
appointed the following week and later elected to full term to join Harry Reid. 
5 Representatives are based off of state population, however each state must have one (History, 2018). 
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mean of average Medicare payments increased 65%, while the mean of average total payments 
increased 71%.6 Due to the fact that there was a slight increase in total discharges, this suggests 
that trips to the hospital are becoming more expensive and Medicare reimbursement is increasing 
along with that. 
 Building on the previous dataset, the third dataset utilized was the Medicare Spending per 
Beneficiary (MSPB) Spending Breakdowns by Claim Type file, or, the Medicare Hospital 
Spending by Claim. The data contained 69,631 observations for fiscal year 2015. The variables 
included in the dataset include: hospital name, provider ID, state, period, claim type, average 
spending per episode at the hospital, state and national level, percent of spending at the hospital, 
state and national level and start and end date. Average spending per episode (hospital, state or 
national) is the average spending for each claim type at that specific level. An episode is defined 
as a patient's trip to the hospital. 
 Utilizing average spending per episode (nation) as the dependent variable, I only included 
average spending per episode (state and hospital) because as previously mentioned, I am only 
concentrated on hospital reimbursement. An MSPB episode is defined as containing all Medicare 
Part A and Part B claims paid during the period from 3 days prior to a hospital admission 
through 30 days after discharge. For each provider, the following Medicare claim types are 
accounted for: skilled nursing facility, durable medical equipment, carrier, home health agency, 
hospice, inpatient, outpatient and total. Utilizing a data set that incorporates all these variables 
will allow me to show the full effect of hospital reimbursement policy changes (Medicare 
Spending, 2018). However, this data set does not provide the total discharge variable as the prior 
data sets did. This data set was initially constructed at the hospital level, so all that needed to be 
                                               
6 In 2015 the United States inflation rate was 0.12%, which fell from 3.16% in 2011 (Inflation, 2018). 
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done was the designation of a code to each state to allow for state fixed effects. Also, provider ID 
fixed effects were taken into account for this model. In the next section I will discuss the 
econometric models used to test my hypotheses on the implementation of Medicare policy 
changes in 2015.    
5. Methodology 
 In order to obtain a full understanding of the impact of MACRA on hospital 
reimbursement I have constructed seven equations. Primarily based on the model used by He and 
Mellor (2012), who utilized Medicare reimbursement rates for given procedures, hospital fixed 
effects and hospital-year-level controls to analyze outpatient surgical procedures. My model also 
stems from White and Wu (2013) and Bazzoli et al. (2004) work. White and Wu (2013) 
primarily focused on hospital inpatient revenues (Part A of Medicare), which tells the best story 
of hospital reimbursements. Bazzoli et al. (2004), utilized total hospital expenditures. I utilized 
average covered charges, which closely relates to their variable. My study focused on inpatient 
hospital stays using similar variables, controlling for both state and hospitals. I hypothesized that 
the implications of MACRA would lower costs for physicians of hospitals and would increase 
reimbursements over the four-year period studied. Also, with a greater emphasis placed on 
reimbursing properly for value provided, I hypothesized that physicians of hospitals, to place 
even more emphasis on providing higher value care, because it will now be incentivized 
accordingly. The following equations have been constructed to test my hypotheses. Equations 1-
4 utilize robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
(1)  ln(2011𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(2011𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽2 ln(2011𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠)  +
𝛽3 ln(2011𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝜕𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
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Equation 1 illustrates the unknown relationship between the natural log of average total 
payments to hospitals in 2011, to the natural logs of the number of total discharges, average 
amount of covered charges and average amount of Medicare payments in 2011. The equation 
utilizes state fixed effects. I hypothesized that an increase in total discharges, along with an 
increase in average covered charges billed to Medicare, would then in turn increase average 
Medicare payments, which would then increase average total payments to a provider. This 
hypothesis is based partly on White and Wu (2013), who discovered that the payment cuts in 
1997 resulted in a $1 reduction in Medicare inpatient revenues and a $1.55 reduction in overall 
net patient revenues, however I envisioned increases to occur. 
(2) ln(2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(2015𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽2 ln(2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠)  +
𝛽3 ln(2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝜕𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    
 
Equation 2 illustrates the same as equation 1, however for fiscal year 2015. 
(3) ln(2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(2015𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽2 ln(2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠)  +
𝛽3 ln(2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Equation 3 illustrates the same as equation 2, this time controlling for whether or not a State 
experienced a change in political party affiliation between at least one of their Senators from 
2011 to 2015. 
 
(4) ln (2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(2015𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽2 ln(2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠)  +
𝛽3 ln(2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝛽4 ln(2011𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝛽5 ln(2011𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠) +
𝛽6 ln(2011𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽7 ln(2011𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝜕𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Equation 4 illustrates the natural log of 2011’s potential impact on the natural log of 2015’s 
average total payments. One would expect that 2011 hospital reimbursements would affect 
hospital reimbursements in 2015, regardless of policy implementation. This model incorporates 
all variables for both years, controlling for state fixed effects.  
 (5) 2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
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Equation 5 illustrates the relationship between the average spending per episode at the national 
level, with the average spending per episode per hospital and state as the independent variables. 
This specific model controls for each provider ID to see if it varies at the hospital level. 
(6) 2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝜕𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Similar to equation 5, equation 6 illustrates the same relationship, this time controlling at the 
state level to see if any changes occurred. 
(7)  2015𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝜕𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖 
 
Equation 7 illustrates the average spending per episode at the national level, however this time 
utilizing fixed effects at both the state and provider ID level. In the next section I will analyze the 
results obtained from each equation. 
6. Results  
 As shown in Appendix B, Tables 1 and 2, show the summary statistics for the two years 
studied. It is interesting to note that in 2011 the mean for total discharges was 2,189.658, while 
the mean for total discharges in 2015 was only 2,354.548, which is not that much larger. 
However, the means for the other independent variables, average covered charges and average 
Medicare payments, tell a much different story. In 2011, average covered charges was 
$1,847,746, while in 2015, average covered charges almost tripled to $3,518,594. Also in 2011, 
average Medicare payments was only $432,589.5, increasing to $716,494.5 in 2015. So, in 2011, 
average total payments was $494,445.8 and increased to $843,794.4 in 2015. This explains that 
without a large increase in total discharges over the four-year period, both average covered 
charges and average Medicare payments experienced a large increase, ultimately increasing 
average total payments. This re-emphasizes the impact MACRA is having on physicians of 
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hospitals as they are prioritizing value and quality of care over volume. Just the summary 
statistics alone represent an increase in hospital reimbursement over the years. 
 Appendix B, Table 3, shows the estimated coefficients from the equations for the 
individual fiscal years. As displayed, an interesting difference among the natural logs for 2011 
and 2015 exists. In 2011 (column 1), a 1% increase in total discharges meant a 0.0213% increase 
in average total payments, while in 2015 (column 2), the same 1% increase resulted in only a 
0.00575% increase in average total payments. Also, in 2011 total discharges shows 1% 
significance, while 2015 total discharges shows none. This is interesting because as shown in 
Appendix B, Table 2, there are more mean discharges in 2015. 
 In 2011, a 1% increase in average covered charges increased average total payments 
0.0481%, while the same increase in 2015 only increased average total payments 0.0412%. I find 
it interesting how much a 1% increase in average Medicare payments increases average total 
payments, by 0.911% and 0.939% for 2011 and 2015 respectively. Both 2011 and 2015 show 1% 
significance. This reiterates how prevalent Medicare payments are in hospital operations (44.3% 
in 2014) as they had more of an increase than average covered charges (Healthcare Finance 
Staff, 2014).  
 In column 3, the estimated standard errors are shown for 2015 utilizing Senator party 
fixed effects. In terms of total discharges, a 1% increase in total discharges lead to a 0.0164% 
increase in average total payments. This is interesting because the coefficient is bigger than the 
standard errors in 2015 when controlling for state fixed effects and also shows 1% significance. 
In terms of whether or not political party affiliation had an impact on Medicare reimbursement, 
the results for average Medicare payments in columns 2 and 3 are almost the same (0.939% and 
0.938% respectively). Also, when controlling for Senator party fixed effects, average covered 
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charges actually decreased when compared to column 2. A 1% increase in average covered 
charges resulted in a 0.0330% increase in average total payments. Both 2011 and 2015 models 
show high r-squared values. 
Appendix B, Table 4, shows the estimated coefficients for the natural log of 2011’s 
potential impact on the natural log of 2015 average total payments. Opposite of when the models 
are independent of one another, as shown in Appendix B, Table 3, some 2011 coefficients are 
now negative, when regressed with 2015. In 2015, a 1% increase in total discharges resulted in a 
0.0178% increase on 2015 average total payments. A 1% increase in total discharges in 2011 
resulted in a 0.0296% decrease on 2015 average total payments. This suggests a strong 
correlation in prior hospital performances that could affect a hospital's financial well-being in 
future years. It is interesting to note that the only positive 2011 coefficient in this model is for 
2011 average total payments. A 1% increase in 2011 average total payments resulted in a 0.6% 
increase in 2015 average total payments. So, although 2011 average total payments increased 
2015 average total payments, 2011 average covered charges and average Medicare payments 
both decreased 2015 average total payments (0.108% and 0.471% respectively). This is hard to 
fathom as both average covered charges determine the average Medicare payments, which 
ultimately determines a large part of average total payments. This goes against my initial 
hypothesis and I conclude is due to MACRA instituting emphasis on value over volume. 
Appendix B, Table 5, displays the estimated coefficients for the average spending per 
episode in the United States for 2015. For all the independent variables, the coefficients are 
rather similar, regardless of what is being controlled for. When provider ID is controlled for, 
regardless of whether state is too, the results are the same. For the most part, a 1 unit increase in 
average spending per episode at the state level resulted in just over a 1% increase in average 
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spending per episode in the United States for all three models. For average spending per episode 
at the hospital level, a 1 unit increase resulted in a rather small decrease in average spending per 
episode at the national level. I find it interesting that across all three models when a hospital’s 
spending per episode increases, it actually decreases the average spending per episode in the 
United States. This is not an area specific to my study but something for future research to 
potentially address. All three models have the same r-squared values of 0.997. The next section 
will address key discussion points. 
7. Discussion 
 The results are similar to the findings presented by White and Wu (2013) and He and 
Mellor (2012). White and Wu (2013) discovered that the payment cuts in 1997 resulted in a $1 
reduction in Medicare inpatient revenues and a $1.55 reduction in overall net patient revenues, 
which are similar results to what I discovered. He and Mellor (2012) discovered that payment 
reforms that retain a fee-for-service are not effective as they increase demand for Medicare 
patients, not actually decreasing Medicare costs. My findings from MACRA confirm this. 
As previously stated, I hypothesized that an increase in total discharges, along with an 
increase in average covered charges billed to Medicare, would then in turn increase average 
Medicare payments, which would then increase average total payments to a provider. As 
displayed in the results section as well as Appendix B, Table 3, this was true. I have concluded 
that this is because MACRA has placed a greater emphasis on providing higher quality care that 
the impact of total discharges on average total payments decreased from 2011 to 2015. This 
means that the more patients admitted into the hospital and eventually discharged from the 
hospital does not necessarily mean more money for the hospital, which is shown in 2015. Due to 
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the fact MACRA emphasizes value not volume, I can now see why this would be shown in the 
results. 
I also hypothesized that the implications of MACRA would lower costs for physicians of 
hospitals, and would increase reimbursements over the four-year period studied, which was 
confirmed in the findings. Also, with a greater emphasis placed on reimbursing properly for 
quality care provided, I hypothesized physicians of hospitals to place even more emphasis on 
providing higher value care, because it will now be incentivized accordingly. However, it is 
important to note that in 2011 there were 48,944,303 Medicare beneficiaries in America, while in 
2015 that number increased to 55,504,005 (Total Number of Medicare, 2016). So, although there 
were clear increases in the variables studied, it is unclear whether that was due strictly to policy 
change, as the number of Medicare enrollees and increase in cost of medical services could have 
also played a large role. It is important to note that no other policy changes were implemented in 
2015, so if the results stand true, MACRA is the only policy change that would affect hospital 
reimbursements. The next section will discuss policy implications of MACRA. 
7A. Policy Implications 
As prior health economists have shown, Medicare policy changes could affect hospital 
reimbursements by either increasing or decreasing their bottom line. These policy changes did 
either increase or decrease bottom lines, but they did not necessarily influence the relationship 
between the patient and the physician as much as MACRA may have. As shown through the 
literature regarding TEFRA in 1982, which introduced the PPS to reimburse hospitals for the 
actual costs they were incurring, TEFRA had a positive influence on hospitals across the country. 
Guterman and Dobson (1986) discovered that despite a 3.5% decrease in admissions, hospitals 
experienced a 44% increase in net-income. The literature analyzing the BBA of 1997, which cut 
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back on Medicare spending to further prolong the HI fund, showed decreases of 7% in revenue 
(Das, 2013). Then, the BBRA of 1999, which was implemented to increase Medicare spending 
as it had slowed down too much in prior years, increased Medicare reimbursement. All these 
policy changes forced physicians to either change their patient mix by either admitting more or 
less Medicare patients depending on the legislation. However, for MACRA, that is not the case. 
More patients will not bring more payments, and neither will less. It is all dependent of the 
quality of care delivered to the patients. Like the integration of the PPS, this is a major change in 
health care, which changes the way physicians interact with their patients, specifically in terms 
of bed side manner and overall quality of care.  
Utilizing CMS.gov National Health Expenditures Projections from 2017-2026 I was able 
to simulate the predicted impact of MACRA. Medicare spending is expected to grow 
approximately 8% per year on average through 2026 (National Health Expenditure, 2017). As 
explained further in the next section, if my study incorporated more years I would envision it to 
look like this: the mean of average Medicare payments in 2016 to be $773,814.06 and to grow to 
$1,804,255.06 in 2026 (assuming no other policy changes or out of the ordinary inflation 
occurs). For average total payments, assuming that for every 1% increase in average Medicare 
payments there continues to be a 0.939% increase in average total payments, I was able to 
simulate the predicted impact up through 2026. In 2026, the mean of average total payments will 
be $2,012,426.07. Since there are 3,125 hospitals in my study, that is $643.98 per hospital. This 
number does not seem to make sense, this may be due to the fact that some hospitals have 11 
total discharges a year, while others have close to 37,000, so there is a wide range when it comes 
to hospital size. 
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8. Limitations 
The study I have conducted is limited in two key areas. First, due to the fact MACRA 
was implemented in 2015, it does not mean that the effects of MACRA necessarily hit hospitals 
right away. Also suggested in Table 4, it usually takes a few years for hospitals to adjust 
institutionally before there are noticeable policy implications shown. That being said, the latest 
data available was for 2015. As previously stated, the results indicated signs of MACRA being 
implemented, but that could also just be through the organic growth of Medicare over the years. 
As noted by Feder et al. (1987), they did not account for institutional or behavioral changes made 
after implementation. I have thought hard about this, and concluded that the only way to prevent 
this from happening is to have a larger sample size of years within my study, because there does 
not seem to be a variable that could account for all potential changes a hospital would make. 
Also, for the Medicare Spending per Beneficiary (MSPB) Spending Breakdowns by Claim Type 
File, the only year available was 2015. More years would have allowed me to build a stronger 
model to show the policy implications over the years. 
The second area of limitation exists due to an absence of variables that potentially could 
have explained more at the hospital level. These variables include the wage-index of specific 
locations in which there are hospitals, the average income level of specific locations in which 
there are hospitals, the average education level of specific locations in which there are hospitals, 
the average age of specific locations in which there are hospitals, a variable accounting for 
ownership status of a hospital, a county-level fixed effects variable, the number of beds within 
each hospital, the number of physicians within each hospital and the number of admitted 
patients. The wage-index variable would potentially explain the salary of the physicians working 
at the hospital and the average income level variable would potentially explain the wealth of a 
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specific area, whether or not the community would be able to afford private health insurance 
plans or solely rely on Medicare. The average age variable would potentially display whether or 
not a specific hospital provides majority of its care to potential Medicare beneficiaries. For 
example, in 2015, California had 5,644,384 Medicare beneficiaries, while Wyoming only had 
95,055 Medicare beneficiaries. Although I did control for state fixed effects, I believe including 
a county-level fixed effects variable could further improve my study. Lastly, the number of bed 
and doctor variables would potentially show the maximum capacity to which any given hospital 
could operate. Obviously, a small community hospital in Wyoming cannot treat as many patients 
as a large research hospital in a big city in California. With the addition of these variables and 
datasets past 2015, my study would incorporate a more well-rounded story on the impact of 
MACRA on hospital reimbursements. The next section discusses the future of healthcare as well 
as future areas of research for health economists.  
9. Future Research 
Future health economists have a series of challenges ahead of them. Healthcare is 
undergoing a vast change and there will be many key points to pick up on. As the unemployment 
rate is at its lowest level in history, more Americans now have access to health insurance. It is 
unknown if the American system will ever become universal, meaning that everyone receives the 
same quality and level of care for free. What would that do to taxes? More specifically, what 
would that do to the Medicare and Medicaid funds? These could be areas of future research, if 
these changes were to become reality.  
Other areas of future research relate back to my last econometric models shown in 
Appendix B, Table 5, where I stated that across all three models when a hospital’s spending per 
episode increases, it actually decreases the average spending per episode in the United States. 
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This is not an area specific to my study but something for future researchers to potentially 
address. Also, as valued care becomes more and more prevalent across hospitals, future 
researchers will be able to conduct studies that could possibly tell a better story as it becomes a 
more common practice and has been mastered by all. Another potential area to explore would be 
looking at how different hospitals, whether it be a non-profit or a large university teaching 
hospital, reacted to MACRA implementation.   
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A 
 
Table 1: Cost Sharing of Medicare (1966-2018)  
 
 1-60 
Days 
61-90 
Days 
After 90 
Days 
Deductible for each Benefit 
Period 
Monthly Premium 
for Part A 
1966 $40 $10 - - - 
2018 - $335 $670 $1,340 $422/$232* 
* For those who purchase Medicare Part A and have paid Medicare taxes for less than 30 
quarters, the premium is $422. Anything over 30 quarters, the premium decreases to $232. 
 
Reformatted table format and data points from (Santerre and Neun, Medicare.gov) 
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Appendix B 
 
Table 1: 2011 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Tot. Discharges 2,189.658 2,191.944 11 25,828 
Avg. Covered Charges 1,847,746 1,761,648 3,720.44 1.33e+07 
Avg. Medicare 
Payments 
432,589.5 332,663.7 2,610.4 2,023,323 
Avg. Tot. Payments 494,445.8 372,382.2 3,291.319 2,131,831 
N 3,125    
 
Table 2: 2015 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Tot. Discharges 2,354.548 2,785.593 11 36,977 
Avg. Covered Charges 3,518,594 4,877,371 4,398.774 6.17e+07 
Avg. Medicare Payments 716,494.5 920,768.6 3,148.167 8,965,807 
Avg. Tot. Payments 843,794.4 1,101,113 3,966.167 1.05e+07 
N 3,125    
 
Table 3: Natural Log of 2011 and 2015 Average Total Payments 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 2011 Log 
Average 
Total 
Payments 
2015 Log 
Average 
Total 
Payments 
2015 Log 
Average 
Total 
Payments 
    
Tot. Discharges 0.0213*** 0.00575 0.0164*** 
 (0.00327) (0.00558) (0.00475) 
Avg. Covered Charges 0.0481*** 0.0412*** 0.0330*** 
 (0.00435) (0.00547) (0.00378) 
Avg. Medicare Payments 0.911*** 0.939*** 0.938*** 
 (0.00494) (0.00578) (0.00446) 
Constant 0.450*** 0.318*** 0.375*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0281) (0.0227) 
    
Observations 3,125 3,125 3,125 
R-squared 0.998 0.998 0.997 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes No 
Senator Party Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Natural Log of 2011's Potential Impact on Natural Log of 2015's Average Total 
Payments  
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES 2015 Log 
Average Total 
Payments  
  
2015 Tot. Discharges 0.0178*** 
 (0.00672) 
2015 Avg. Covered Charges 0.109*** 
 (0.0108) 
2015 Avg. Medicare Payments 0.876*** 
 (0.0113) 
2011 Avg. Tot. Payments 0.600*** 
 (0.102) 
2011 Tot. Discharges -0.0296*** 
 (0.00531) 
2011 Avg. Covered Charges -0.108*** 
 (0.0119) 
2011 Avg. Medicare Payments -0.471*** 
 (0.0968) 
Constant 0.0760 
 (0.0530) 
  
Observations 3,125 
R-squared 0.998 
State Fixed Effects Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Average Spending Per Episode Nation 2015 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Average 
Spending Per 
Episode 
Nation 
Average 
Spending Per 
Episode 
Nation 
Average 
Spending Per 
Episode 
Nation 
    
Avg Spending State 1.009*** 1.008*** 1.009*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00104) (0.00112) 
Avg Spending Hospital -0.0147*** -0.0132*** -0.0147*** 
 (0.00118) (0.00109) (0.00118) 
Constant 7.228*** 7.230*** 7.228*** 
 (1.073) (1.048) (1.073) 
    
Observations 69,630 69,630 69,630 
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997 
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
Provider ID Fixed Effects Yes No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
